The critical role of economic assumptions in the evaluation of federal budget programs by Keith M. Carlson
The Critical Role of Economic
Assumptions in the Evaluation of Federal
Budget Programs
KEITH M. CARLSON
HEN the Reagan administration announced its
budget program in January this year, the projected
deficits caused considerable public consternation.
Near-term deficits were record-setting in magnitude
and persistently large deficits loomed far into the fu-
ture. The administration’s January 1983budget projec-
tions included a deficit of $225 billion (including off-
budget outlays) for fiscal year 1983 and $157 billion in
1986. Without a proposed contingency tax plan, the
administration estimated the fiscal 1986 deficit would
be $203 billion.’
One problem inherent in evaluating prospective
federal budgets is that receipts and outlays and, thus,
the surplus or deficit depend crucially on the perfor-
mance ofthe economy. This problem is magnified in a
$3.2 trillion economy in which public attention still
focuses on the nominal magnitude of the federal def-
icit. A decline ofjust one or two percentage points in
the annual rateofrealgrowth can add billions ofdollars
to the federal deficit.
The administration’s January budget projections
reflect both modifications of previous proposals and
changes in economic assumptions. As a result, it is
difficult to distinguish between the effect ofthe econ-
omy and the effectofpolicy shifts on the budget. Yet, if
analysts wishto determine the extent to which policy
changes are responsible for the changes in federal
budget projections, the effect of changes im, economic
assumptions on the federal budget must first he iden-
tified.
‘Since this article was prepared, the administration revised its
estimate for fiscal 1986 to $139 billion. Without thecontingency tax
plan, the revised estimate would he $185 billion. See Office of
Management and Budget. Mid-Session Revision of the 1984
Budget (July 1983).
To illustrate the critical role of economic assump-
tions, this article assesses the extent to which they are
responsible for the differences between President
Reagan’s initial March 1981 budget and the January
1983 budget.2
THE SENSITIVITY OF THE BUDGET
TO ECONOMIC ASSUMPTIONS
In recent years, the importance of economic
assumnptions inthe process ofpreparing budget projec-
tions has grown. The last three budget documents
contained sections on the sensitivity of the budget to
economic assumptions. Yet,one ofthebest discussions
ofthis interrelationship is still the 1962 Annual Report
of the Council of Economic Advisers (CEA).
The Original 1962 CEA Analysis
The 1962 CEA developed ameasure ofdiscretionary
fiscal action; at that time it was called the full-employ-
ment surplus.3 Thismeasure was developed because of
nrhe conclusions of the article are not affected hy the July 1983
revisions of the budget or of the GNP accounts.
3
For a recentdiscussion ofthe full-employment (now called ‘high-
employment’) surplus, see Frank de Leeuw, Thomas M. Hollo-
way, Darwin C. Johnson, David S. McClain andCharles A. Waite,
The High-Employment Budget: New Estimates, 1955—80,” Sur-
vey of Current Business (Novemnber 1980), pp. 13—43; Frank de
Leeuw and Thomas M. Holloway, “The High-Employment
Budget: Revised Estimates and Automatic Inflation Effects,” Sur-
veyofCurrent Business (April 1982), pp. 21—33; William Fellner,
“The High-Employment Budget and Potential Output: A Cri-
tique, Survey ofCurrent Business (November 1982), pp. 26—33;
Frank de Leeuw and Thomas NI. Holloway, ‘The High-
Employment Budget and Potential Output: A Respunse,” Survey
of Current I3usiness (November 1982), pp. 33—35.
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the ambiguity associated with using the actualsurplus
or deficit as a measure of fiscal policy actions. The
actual surplus or deficit depends on both the budget
program and the state of the economy. Although the
budget program fixes tax rates and expenditure pro-
grams, actual receipts and outlays vary automatically
with economic activity. According to the 1962 CEA,
To interpret the economic significance of a given
budget it is, therefore, essentialtodistinguish the auto-
nuitic changes in revenues and expenditures from the
discretionary changes which occur when the gov-
ernment varies tax rates or changes expenditure
programs.4
Figure 1 illustrates the reasoning behind the de-
velopmentof thefull-employment surplus asa measure
of discretionary fiscal action. On the horizontal axis is
realgross national product (GNP);on the vertical axis is
the dollar amount of the federal surplus or deficit.5
Each budget line represents a fixed schedule of tax
rates and expenditure programs with each line show-
ing how the actual surplus or deficit depends on the
level of real GNP. Given the U.S. tax structure, re-
ceipts increase with real economic activity, while out-
lays, which are sensitive to unemployment, tend to
decrease with increases in real activity; thus, each
budget line is upward sloping with respect to real
GNP. Shifts of the budget line represent the action of
policymnakers on the budget, while movements along a
budget line represent the effect ofthe economy on the
budget.6 Thus, for example, the budget line would
shift from Ato B ifgovernment outlayswere increased
or taxes reduced.
The advantage of using the analysis in figure 1 to
compare different budget programs is that it separates
the effect ofthe economy from the effect ofthe policy-
maker on the budget. Using figure 1, the 1962 CEA
would have interpreted budget Ba smore expansion-
ary than budget A; since, for example, government
outlays are higher for budget B, a smaller share of
full-employment real GNP is available for private
purchase. Thus, hill employment is easier to maintain
because less private demand is required. Alternative-
~1962 Economic Report of the President, which also includes the
1962 Annual Report of the Council of Economic Advisers, pp.
78—79.
‘I’his differs slightly from the figure drawn in the 1962 CEA Report
(p. 79). The CEA figure had the utilization rate (actual CNP as a
percent ofpotential CNP) on the horizontal axis and the surplus!
deficit as a percent of potential CNP on the vertical axis. To
sirnpli~’the analysis here, dollar amounts are used on both axes.
6
Thc purpose ofthe high-employment budget is to capture shifts of
the budget line. This is done hr focusing on the change in the
surplus or deficitcorresponding to a level of real CNP consistent




Shifts of the budget line indicate program shifts.
Movements along the budget line indicate the
automatic effect of changes in real GNP on the
surplus or deficit. Changes in the surplus or deficit
at full employment are a measure of program shift.
Figure 1
Economic Activity at the Federal Budget
Surplus/Deficit
Billions of dollars
ly, inflation is more difficut to avoid because there are
fewer goods and services to meet privatedemand. The
figure illustrates clearly the pitfalls in assessing the
economic impact of the budget by examining the sur-
plus or deficit alone without regard for the level of
economic activity.
An Extended Analysis
The 1962 CEA analysis provides a useful starting
point for analyzing budget policy in the 1980s. The
analysis requires extension, however, in light of in-
flationary developments overrecent years. This analy-
sis is summarized in the schematic diagram on page 8
and figure 2, which focus on the determination of
federal receipts and outlays.
Receipts — Givemi a structure oftax rates, the most
important determinant of federal receipts is nominal
CNP (see diagram). Most federal taxes are tied to bases
that are sensitive to the movements ofnominal GNP.
Federal taxes are classified according to source: indi-
vidual income, corporate income, socialinsurance, ex-
cise, and other. The most relevant bases for these tax
sources are personal income, wages and salaries,
Full Employment
Budget A
Real GNP (Billions of 1972 dollars
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Figure 2










corporate profits and sales. Each ofthese measures, in
turn, moves closely with nominal GNP. A change in
nominal GNP is translated quickly into a change in
receipts in the same direction, largely because of the
U.S. system of withholding and estimated payments.
The determination of federal receipts is shown in
panel a of figure 2. Real GNP is plotted on the hori-
zontal axis and receipts on the vertical axis. The de-
pendence of receipts on nominal GNP is captured by
drawing a different receipts line for each price level.
Thus, with real GNP on the horizontalaxis, the level of
the receipts line is determined by the structure oftax
ratesand theprice level. Apolicy change — that is, an
increase (decrease) in taxrates — would be shown asan
upward (downward) shift of the receipts line with
prices unchanged. The effect of economic activity on
receipts would be shown either as a movement along
the receipts line or a shift because of a change in the
price level. A higher price level will shift the receipts
Real GNP line upward; more receipts are collected at each level
ofrealGNP because nominal GNP is higher as a result
of a higher price level.
Outlays— Outlays (other than net interest) depend
on both the price level andreal GNP, but the response
is different than for receipts (see schematic diagram).
Price level effects on outlayshavebecome moreimpor-
tant in recent years as an increasing number of pro-
grams become indexed to the cost of living. Although
social security is probably the best known of these
programs, many other programs are now more or less
automatically adjusted to offset price level changes.
Changes in programs like Medicare and food stamps,
in part, have reflected attempts to maintain program
levels in response to chamiges imi the price level.
In addition to programs that are adjusted automati-
cally to changes in the price level, there are mamly
government programs for which Comigress makes dis-
cretionary changesto reflect changes inthe price level.
The most important program falling into this category
is defense spending.
Besides the price level effects cited above, real eco-
nomic activity also has an automatic effect on outlays.
For the most part, this operates viathe effecton unem-
ployment: areduction in real G!’~P or its rateofgrowth
tends to imicrease unemployment and boosts expendi:
tures for unemployment-sensitive programs.’
Real OMP
7Thisrelationshipbetween changes in real CNP and theunemploy-
ment rate is called Okus’s law. See Arthur NI. Okun, “Potential
CNP: Its Measurement and Significance,” 1962 Proceedings of time
Business and Economic Statistics Section of time American Statis-
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Schematic Diagram of Budget Determination
Althoughoutlays for unemployment compensation are
the best known of such programs, other types of ex-
penditures are also affected by a slowingofreal growth
and rising unemployment. Among these are public
assistance, food stamps and social security.
As shown in the schematic diagram, outlays are di-
vided into two components: outlaysother thaninterest
and net interest. The reason forthis division is thatthe
determining factors operate differently. Net interest is
singledout forspecial treatment because it depends on
theinterest rate and the amount ofdebtto be financed.
The amount ofdebt to befinanced, in turn, depends on
the amount of debt inherited from earlier periods as
well as the amount of the current surplus or deficit.
Interest rate assumptions are a function of the rate of
change of the price level rather than the level itself.
This complicated interaction of factors makes it dif
ficult to generalize about the effect of economic
assumptions on outlays. Nevertheless, panel b of
figure 2i sa nattempt to clarify the nature ofthe rela-
tionships.
Ifthe outlay line is interpreted as outlays other than
net interest, the analysis is straightforward. Thedeter-
mination of federal outlays is shown graphically in
panelbo ffigure 2. Real GNP ischarted on thehorizon-
tal axis and the dollar amount ofoutlays is charted on
the vertical axis. The level of the outlay line is deter-
mined by the price level and by laws and programs
relating to outlays. The line is downward sloping be-
causean increase in real GNPreduces unemployment-
sensitive outlays. The effectofahigherprice level is to
shift the outlay line upward. Outlays other than net
interest will be greater for each level of real GNP
because of indexed programs.
If, on the other hand, outlays are defined to include
net interest, the effect ofan increase in the price level
on the outlay line is not unambiguously upward. For a
given level of real GNP, an increase in the price level
increases receipts. Ifthe receipts effect isstronger than
the outlay effect, the deficit declines (or the surplus
increases), requiring a smaller amount ofinterestto be
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or down in response to a change in the price level
depends on the relative strength ofthe effect via non-
interest outlays vs. the effect via the deficit and net
interest.
Surplus/deficit — Panel c offigure 2summarizes the
net effect offactors determining receipts and outlays.
With real GNP plotted on the horizontal axis and the
surplus/deficit plotted on the vertical axis, the general
appearance of the budget line is the same as figure 1.
For a given fiscal program, an increase of real GNP
results ina smallerdeficit orlarger surplus; an increase
of real GNP increases receipts and reduces outlays.
There is no ambiguity about the slope of the budget
line when drawn with real GNP on the horizontal axis.
The nature of the response of the budget line to
changes in the price level is a different matter.
Whether the budget line shifts up ordown depends on
the relative shifts of the receipts and outlay lines.
Receipts shift unambigously upward in response to a
higher price level, but the effect on outlays isambig-
uous. Ifthere are a largenumber of indexed programs
and the cost-of-living escalators are generous, or if a
largenumber ofdiscretionary programs areadjusted to
price level changes, the upward shiftofthe outlay line
could exceed that of the receipts line, leading to a
downward shift of the budget line. Determining the
effect of price level assumptions on the surplus or
deficit is thus an empirical matter.
THE REAGAN’ BUDGET PROGRAM:
1981 VS. 1983
To illustrate the interaction of economic assump-
tions and budget projections, projections forfiscal year
1986 from the Reagan budgets of March 1981 and
January 1983 are examined. The focus is on fiscal 1986
for several reasons: (1) a long horizon allows the effect
of alternative assumptions to be brought into sharper
focus; (2) most of the concern about the size of the
budget deficit emphasizes the “out years,” and thus
approximates what the administration calls a “struc-
tural deficit”; (3) focusing several years out on the
planning horizon, the full effect ofthe administration’s
budget program is captured.
The economic assumptions underlying the two
Reagan budgets are summarized in table 1. The levels
of GNP differ from those published in the relevant
budget documents because of data revisions in the
1981—83 period. All GNP data in table 1 have been
recalculated to be consistent with data as reported in
early 1983.
Economic ~4ssumptions
The GNP assumptions are presented in terms of
both levels and rates of change. Normally, rates of
change are more relevant. The levels of GNP are pre-
sented as well, however, because with a projection
period ofsix years, small differences in rates ofchange
can accumulate into significant differences in the
levels.
As shown in table 1, the estimates of nominal GNP
have been scaled down since 1981. The 1986 GNP
estimate from the 1981 budget was $5,071 billion;
the 1983 budget revised this estimate downward
to $4,366 billion. In large part, this revision occurred
because actual 1982 GNP turned out to be consider-
ably below the projection made in 1981. The budget
impact of this revised assumption is illustrated by
assuming an average tax rate of 20 percent. With no
changein taxlaws (fromlate 1980), theeffect ofrevised
assumptions since early 1981 would be to reduce tax
collections in 1986 by $140 billion [(4,336—5,071) x
.20].
In 1981, the Reagan administration was very opti-
mistic about future levels of real GNP. Real GNP for
1986 was projected at $1,873 billion (1972 dollars). In
January 1983, this projection was reviseddownward to
$1,707 billion. Over $100 billion of this revision was
attributable to the overestimate of 1982 real GNP.
Price level estimates have also been scaled back
since 1981. The 1981 budget projected the 1986 price
level at 271.0 (1972 = 100). The lower-than-expected
price level in 1982 produced a downward revisiomi of
projected pricetrends throughout the 1983—86period.
Unemployment assumptions go hand-in-hand with
the real growth assumptions. The administration’s
forecast of unemployment for 1986 was 5.6 percent.
The 1983 budgetjumped the unemployment assump-
tion to 8.0 percent, reflecting both the sharp drop of
real GNP in 1982 and the downward revision of the
1983—86 projections of real GNP.
Interest rate assumptions usually reflect inflation
rates, but the assumptions shown in table 1 generally
are not consistent with that relationship. In March
1981, the Reagan administration began with an opti-
mistic outlook for interest rates for the long term, but
the high interest rates of 1981 and 1982 led to a sharp
upward revision in January 1983. Consequently, he-
tween 1981 and 1983 interest rate projections were
increased even though projected inflation rates were
reduced.
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Budget Projections
The projections for the budget based on the eco-
nomic assumptions in table 1 are summarized in table
2. The 1981 budget projected outlays (including off-
budget) for 1986 at $961 billion. “Targeted” outlays
were set at $912 billion, butthe administration didnot
specify where theadditional cuts wereto be made. The
1983 budget projects 1986 outlays at $999billion. This
increase from $961 to $999 billion is roughly the
amount by which actual 1982 outlays exceeded the
original estimate.
The receipts side of the budget has taken a more
dramatic turn since the Reagan administration took
office in 1981. The 1981 Reagan budget projected re-
ceiptsfor 1986at $940billion. Includedin this estimate
were changes in tax law that reduced receipts by $218
billion fromn what they otherwisewould be. Compared
to the original Reagan proposals in 1981, total receipts
estimates for 1986 have been scaled back by almost
another $100 billion to $842 billion. Without the pro-
posed contingency tax of$46 billion, the 1986 receipts
estimate would be $796 billion.
The original Reagan budget projected the deficit for
1986 at $21 billion. The January 1983 budget has re-
vised this estimate of the 1986 deficit to $157 billion.
Without the contingency tax, the estimate of the 1986
deficit would be $203 billion.
AN ANALYSIS OF THE TWO REAGAN
BUDGETS
The revisions in the budget by the Reagan admin-
istration appear to be very large, especially when at-
tention is focused on the deficit for fiscal 1986. The
January 1983budget appears to be much more expan-
siomiary than the March 1981 budget. As shown in table
1, however, the economic assumnptious have also been
revised greatly. The questions asked here are to what
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extent have economic assumptions altered the esti-
mates ofthe deficit in 1986, and to what extent do the
revisions reflect program shifts?
Explanation of Procedure
To apply the analysis of figure 2 to the Reagan
budgets, two alternatives are available. One is tocon-
vert the 1983 budget estimates to estimates based on
the assumptions made in the 1981 budget. Theother is
to recalculate the 1981 budget on the basis of 1983
assumptions. Either way, theconclusion willbe essen-
tially the same, that is, the relative positions ofthe two
budget lines will be about the same. The alternative
chosen here is to compare the 1983 budget with the
1981 budget recalculated with assumptions from the
January 1983 budget.
The primary basis for recalculating the 1981 bud-
get is an estimate of the degree of response of
outlays and receipts to changes in nominal and real
GNP and the price level. These response coefficients
were calculated from estimates given in the January
1983 budget.8
5Offlce of Management and Budget, Budget of the United States
Government: Fiscal Year 1984 (January 1983). Also seetheappen-
dix to this article. It should he noted that these estimates are
approximate and, in the ease ofoutlays, include only the effect of
indexed programs.
1981 vs. 1983 Budget: A Graphic•
Summary
Figure 3 summarizes the two budgets using the
format developed in figure 2. A numerical summary
appears in table 3.
Receipts — The solid line in the receipts panel of
figure 3i sa nestimatefrom the Jamiuary 1983 budget of
how 1986 receipts varywith real GNP, using the price
level as projected in that budget. To compare the
receipts line from the March 1981 budget (dashed
line), one must recalculate those estimates with the
January 1983 assumption about the price level. Once
this is done, a comparison ofthe two receipts lines (the
solid limie and the dotted line), which can also be
thought of as program lines, indicates very little
change from 1981 to 1983.°
The main reason for the downward revision of re-
ceipts from March 1981 to January 1983 is the down-
ward revision of the real GNP assumption. Table 3
divides the total change imi receipts into price level
9
Even though figure 2 shows little change in the receipts program
from 1981 to 1983, this doesnot imply thatlittle has changed. The
original Reagan tax plams was modified somewhat in the legislative
embodimentofthat plan, the Economic Reeoven’Tax Act of 1981.
The other two major tax acts since 1981 are the Tax Equity and
Fiscal Responsibility Actof1982 amad the HighwayRevenoe Act of
1982.
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Figure 3
Economic Activity and the Federal Budget:
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effects, real GNP effects and program shifts. According
to table 3 (and table 2), receipts projections for 1986
were revised downward by $144 billion between
March 1981 and January 1983. Real GNP revisions
accounted for $95billion ofthis change and price level
revisions accounted for $57 billion. These estimates
suggest a small upward program shiftfor receipts of$7
billion between early 1981 and early 1983. Even
though the estimates are approximate, it is clear that
the program shift was small compared with changes
induced by changed economic assumptions.’°
Outlays — The outlay panelof figure 3 summarizes
the effect on fiscal 1986 outlays of revised assumptions
‘°Recallthat this analysis is being conducted in the absence of the
proposed contingency tax. Including that taxwould show a sharp
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Table 3
Decomposition of Changed Budget Estimates for Fiscal 1986
(billions of dollars)
Change due Change due Change due
Total change to price to real to program
1981 to 1983 level GNP shift
Receipts $ 1443 $ 567 $ 960 $ 74
Outlays 378 247 442 31.1
Surplus deficit 1821 814 ~1392 385
andprogram shifts from March 1981 to January 1983. A
comparison ofthe solid and dotted lines indicates that
the outlay line has shifted down significantly since
1981. According to these estimates, the fiscal 1986
outlay program has been reduced by $31 billion since
March 1981.
The effectofchanged price level assumptions on the
March 1981 estimates requires ftirther explanation.
Compared to 1981, price level assumptions were re-
duced in January 1983. The effect of these revisions
was to reduce outlays other than net interest.11 How-
ever, with the assumed response coefficients, the
effect ofreduced price level assumptions lowered re-
ceipts more than outlays. As a result, deficits were
larger and more interest would have tohave been paid
to finance these deficits. The indirect effect of a lower
price level operating via net interest dominates the
direct effect on outlays over a five-year period.
The numerical summary in table 3 indicates that
changed assumptions about real GNP and the price
level “overexplaiued” the $38 billion upward revision
ofthe 1986 outlay projection. In other words, changed
economic assumptions indicated an increase ofoutlays
of $69 billion, whereas the outlay projection was
actually increased by $38 billion. Within this
framework of analysis, this implies a downward pro-
“Note that thediscussion iswith reference totheeffect ofchanged
pricelevel assumptions on the March1981 estimates ofoutlays for
fiscal 1986,
gram shiftfor outlaysof$31 billion between early 1981
and early 1983.
Surplus/deficit — Figure 3 shows that the budget
line shifted upward from March 1981 to January
1983.12 As summarizedin table 3, the 1986budget line
shifted upward by $39billion. On the surface, this shift
appears quite large, but relative to the changes attrib-
utable to revised economic assumptions, it is quite
small.
CONCLUSIONS
This article has focused on the critical role that eco-
nomic assumptions play in projections of the federal
budget. As an example, estimates for fiscal year 1986
from the Reagan budgets of March 1981 and January
1983 were compared. The analysis indicates that the
changes in budget estimates for fiscal 1986 that oc-
curred between March 1981 and January 1983 were
primarily influencedby revised economic assumptions
and economic developments in 1982 that were con-
siderably different than foreseen. Changes in discre-
tionary fiscal policy played a minor role in accounting
for the sizable jump in the projected deficit for 1986
that occurred between the two budget proposals.
‘2Note that this shift is still in the planning stage. Realization of
the shift requires legislation by the Congress of administration
proposals.
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Appendix
Estimating the Response of the Budget
to Alternative Economic Assumptions
To estimate the effect on budget projections of an The implied coefficients for the elasticity of outlays
alternative set of economic assumptions, the budget with respect to inflation were
was categorized as follows:
= .O1XP1
+ .O6aP~~ + .09AP~_~+ .05aP~~3 1) total receipts excluding earnings of the Federal
Reserve System; + .O2AP,~
4
+ .02AE~
2) total outlays(including off-budget) excluding net
where interest and earnings of the Federal Reserve
System; = change in percent change in the GNP deflator in
3) net interest, fiscal year t.
The basic source for estimates of the relevant elastici- These estimates arefor indexed program outlays only;
ties was the Budget ofthe United States Government: excluded are changes that might result from congres-
Fiscal Year 1984 (January 1983), pp. 2-19—2-24. sional or executive action to maintain real program or
benefit levels for discretionary programs.
Total receipts excluding PBS earnings
The elasticity of receipts with respect to GNP was ~‘et interest, surplus/deficit and debt
calculated from the example in thefiscal 1984 budget.
The implied coefficients were To estimate netinterest, the surplus/deficitand debt
held by the public, the following three-equation sys-
Alit = .49AY~ + .39At~1
+ .12At
5~2




where 1) It = I, ~ + (i~ ir) (~ a~D~_ ~) + i~[~(D~ — 1)]
= changein percentchangeofreceiptsin fiscal year t; 2) D~ = — S~ + AC,
At = change in percent change in nominal GNP in fiscal
yeart. 3)S~= R~ 0~
where
Total outlays excluding net •interest and t fiscal year (flows are during the year and stocks
PBS earnings are end ofyear);
It = net interest in fiscal year t (excluding FRS
Outlays are responsive to both real growth and infla- earnings);
tion. The implied coefficients for the elasticity of out- = debt held by the public (including FRS) at the
lays with respect to real growth were end of fiscal year t; S~ = budget surplus;
AO~ — .O8AX, — .13Ak, — .O5AX~
2
— .oeak~_, AC~= change in Treasury cash balance;
.04AX~4. = receipts as calculated above;
= outlays as calculated above;
where i~ = average of 3-month Treasury bill and 10-year
AO, = change in percent changeofoutlays in fiscal year t; .,~ Treasury note rates;
it = average interest rate on debt maturing during
= change in percent change in real GNP in fiscal period t;
year t. proportion of debt maturing in period t.
14